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I. PRAGMATIC ENRICHMENT AND CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 
 
The phrase "pragmatic enrichment" is sometimes used in a broad sense to refer to the process 
in virtue of which the content conveyed by an utterance comes to include all sorts of elements 
which are contextually implied without being part of what the utterance literally means. In his 
class notes "Pragmatic Enrichment : Introduction by Examples," Chris Potts gives examples 
like the following: 
 
(1) John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino is Mary‘s ex-boyfriend. 
One evening, John asks Mary, ―Have you seen Valentino this week?‖ Mary answers, 
―Valentino‘s been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.‖ Valentino has in fact 
been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had 
a date with Valentino the night before. 
 
Mary‘s utterance clearly suggests a negative (and false) answer to the question : "Have you 
seen Valentino this week ?" Literally, however, she only says that Valentino has been sick 
with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, and that is true. 
 In his William James Lectures delivered at Harvard in the late sixties, Grice described 
the mechanism through which one can mean one thing by saying another (Grice 1989). The 
term of art coined by Grice for that mechanism is "conversational implicature." Thus, in (1), 
Mary ‗says‘ that Valentino has been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, and 
‗conversationally implicates‘ that she has not seen him this week. 
On Grice‘s account, implicatures are derived through an inference which enables the 
interpreter to grasp the speaker‘s communicative intention despite the fact that it‘s not 
articulated in words. The inference makes use of two crucial premisses (in addition to 
background knowledge): (1) the fact that the speaker has said what she has said (here, that 
Valentino has been sick etc.), and (2) the fact that the speaker, qua communicator, obeys (or is 
supposed to obey) the rules of communication or, as Grice puts it, the "maxims of 
conversation." Because of the role played by the first premiss in the inference through which 
they are derived, conversational implicatures belong to the ‗post-semantic‘ layer of 
interpretation. This means that, in order to derive the implicatures of an utterance, an 
interpreter must start by identifying what the speaker literally says. (The properly semantic 
layer of interpretation corresponds to the identification of what is said — the proposition 
literally expressed.) 
It is customary in the literature to equate "pragmatic" and "post-semantic," but this is 
not quite right, for two reasons. First, there is a ‗pre-semantic‘ layer of interpretation which, 
like the post-semantic layer, involves a good deal of pragmatic reasoning aimed at figuring 
 2 
out the speaker‘s communicative intention. Semantic interpretation takes disambiguated 
expressions as inputs, and computes their contents as a function of the contents of their 
constituents and the way they are syntactically combined (plus the context, when the sentence 
contains indexicals or context-sensitive expressions). No such computation can take place 
unless the sentence has been properly disambiguated. In this pre-semantic task, background 
knowledge and the presumption that the speaker obeys the maxims of conversation play an 
obvious role. As David Kaplan points out, if a haberdasher says "I am out of checks'" to a 
banker, "whether the utterance takes place in the store or at the bank will help the banker to 
determine what the haberdasher has said" (Kaplan 1978: 229), and it will do so by pre-
semantically selecting the relevant reading for the word "check." Pragmatics is therefore 
involved at the pre-semantic level, just as it is involved at the post-semantic level. 
Pragmatics is also involved at the semantic level, and that is the second reason why 
one should reject the equation of "pragmatic" and "post-semantic." To compute the 
proposition expressed by an utterance, it is necessary to assign contextual values to 
indexicals, (unbound) pronouns etc. For example, if the speaker uses a demonstrative pronoun 
and says '"She is cute," the hearer must determine who the speaker means by "she" in order to 
fix the utterance's truth-conditional content. This contextual assignment of values to 
indexicals and pronouns is a pragmatic affair, just like disambiguation or the derivation of 
implicatures. In all three cases one has to use contextual cues (and the presumption that the 
speaker obeys the maxims of conversation) to figure out what the speaker‘s intentions are. 
To sum up, utterance interpretation involves pragmatic reasoning at three levels : (i) at 
the pre-semantic level one must determine which (disambiguated) sentence is intended among 
various candidates compatible with the proferred signal ; (ii) at the semantic level one must 
assign contextual values to the context-sensitive elements in the sentence in order to 
determine the proposition expressed ; (iii) at the post-semantic level one must derive the 
conversational implicatures. Only in the last type of case (the implicatures) does the inference 
presuppose that the proposition expressed (what is said) has been identified. 
Now, pace Potts, the phrase "pragmatic enrichment" on its standard use is meant to 
contrast with "conversational implicature," instead of being a non-technical synonym for it 
(as it is for Potts). On the standard use, while conversational implicatures belong to the post-
semantic layer of interpretation, pragmatic enrichment belongs to the semantic layer : it 
affects the proposition expressed by an utterance. This puts pragmatic enrichment in the same 
ballpark as the assignment of contextual values to indexicals and free pronouns. 
 
II. PRAGMATIC ENRICHMENT AND SEMANTIC UNDER-SPECIFICATION 
 
What, then, is the difference between pragmatic enrichment and the contextual assignment of 
values to indexicals and pronouns if both belong to the semantic layer of interpretation? 
Following Kaplan, let us call "content" the contribution an expression makes to the truth-
conditions of the utterance in which it occurs. Context-sensitive expressions are such that 
their linguistic meaning does not fix their content : their content depends upon the context. In 
the case of standard indexicals, pronouns, etc., the expression is like a free variable to which a 
content must be assigned in context, and its linguistic meaning merely constrains the contents 
which may be contextually assigned to it. For example, the linguistic meaning of the pronoun 
"she" in the above example carries gender and number features which (presuppositionally) 
constrain the reference of the pronoun : the reference must be a female individual. The 
content of the pronoun is whatever is assigned to it in the context of utterance (in virtue of the 
speaker‘s intentions etc.), provided the assigned value satisfies the presuppositions carried by 
the pronoun. 
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 In other cases, a contextual value is not directly assigned to the expression, but the 
content of the expression still depends upon the context. For example, "ready" and "tall," 
without an accompanying prepositional phrase, are context-sensitive because they can be used 
to ascribe different properties in different contexts — the property of being ready for the walk 
vs ready for dinner,  or the property of being tall for a six-grader vs tall for a basketball 
player. Some authors talk of pragmatic enrichment in that sort of case : the meaning of 
"ready" or "tall," they say, is under-specified and has to be pragmatically enriched through the 
contextual provision of a meaning constituent expressible by means of a prepositional phrase 
("for dinner," "for a six-grader"). Since the enrichment in question is mandatory, the meaning  
of the semantically under-specified item can be represented as involving a free variable to 
which a value must be contextually assigned: thus "ready" arguably means something like 
ready for x and "tall" means something like tall for an X. In the syntax, however, there 
arguably is no variable — only a semantically under-specified lexical item whose meaning 
carries what Kratzer (2009) has called a "conceptual" variable. The variable is introduced in 
the semantics, via the lexical entry for the item, while in the case of pronouns and indexicals, 
the lexical item occurring in the syntactic structure is itself (like) a variable. 
The treatment of context-sensitive expressions like "ready" and "tall" I have just 
described is actually controversial. Some authors think that, associated with lexical items like  
"ready" and "tall," there is a (covert) variable/pronominal expression in the syntax (Stanley 
2000, Marti 2006). In context, a value must be assigned to that covert variable, just as a 
contextual value must be assigned to overt pronouns. If this is true, then there is no need to 
talk of semantic under-specification or pragmatic enrichment in that sort of case — it is just 
an ordinary case of contextual assignment of value to pronominal elements in syntactic 
structure. 
In other cases, however, the idea of semantic under-specification triggering pragmatic 
enrichment may be harder to resist. Thus Kratzer (2010) says that "pragmatic enrichment is 
not just allowed, but required, for the interpretation of noun-noun compounds like swan 
boat." Neither "swan" nor "boat" is context-sensitive (let us assume) — both lexical items 
have a content independent of context — but the compound "swan boat" is : its content must 
be pragmatically fixed through the contextual provision of a relevant relation R between 
swans and boats, such that only boats bearing that relation to swans end up in the extension of  
"swan boat." What we seem to have here is constructional context-sensitivity : the context-
dependence of the content of  "swan boat" is not inherited from the context-dependence of the 
contents of its parts, but comes from the construction itself. The content of the noun-noun 
construction is semantically under-specified : it has to be fleshed out through the contextual 
provision of the relevant relation R. 
To be sure, there have been has attempts to provide ‗indexical‘ analyses of compound 
nouns (CNs). Thus, according to Weiskopf (2007 : 175), 
  
The linguistic meaning of CNs contains a phonologically unrealized open variable or 
otherwise indexical expression that picks out the relation among their constituents, and 
this relation is filled in by pragmatic mechanisms that draw on features of the context 
of utterance. 
 
But the variable R* which Weiskopf posits is introduced via the semantic rules associated 
with the noun-noun construction, which he calls the "rules of CN Interpretation," e.g. : 
 
[[N1 N2]] =λx[N’2(x)&R∗(x,N’1)] 
 
So it is, as he puts it, "the meaning of CNs" which carries the variable. The variable in 
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question is therefore a conceptual variable and is not supposed to be present in the syntax. (In 
this respect it is somewhat misleading to say that the variable is "phonologically unrealized," 
for that notion only applies to elements present in syntactic structure.) 
 
III. FREE PRAGMATIC ENRICHMENT 
 
I have just illustrated the use of the phrase "pragmatic enrichment" in connection with 
semantic under-specification and conceptual variables. On that use it is possible to say, as 
Kratzer does, that pragmatic enrichment is required for the interpretation of a given type of 
expression. But that is not the standard use of the phrase "pragmatic enrichment." On the 
standard use, pragmatic enrichment is never required. It is the standard use of the phrase (and 
the phenomenon it designates) which I will focus on in what follows. 
On the standard use, just as it contrasts with conversational implicatures, pragmatic 
enrichment contrasts with the assignment of values to free variables, whether the variables in 
question are construed as conceptual (introduced via lexical entries) or syntactic. What 
characterizes the contextual assignment of values to free variables of all categories is that it is 
mandatory : no proposition is expressed unless a value is assigned to the variable. Thus if I 
say "John is ready" but the context does not answer the question : "ready for what ?", I 
haven‘t said anything definite ; I haven‘t expressed a complete proposition. Similarly, if I say  
"she is cute" but no individual can be contextually singled out as the reference of the 
demonstrative pronoun "she," no proposition has been expressed. Likewise, if I use the phrase 
"swan boat," but the context does not specify any relevant relation R between swans and 
boats, my utterance fails to express a complete content. In all these cases, where the provision 
of some contextual element is mandatory, I talk of "saturation" : a slot has to be contextually 
filled, which leaves the utterance semantically incomplete in case it remains unfilled. In 
contrast, pragmatic enrichment — or more explicitly : free pragmatic enrichment — is not 
mandatory but optional. There is enrichment in that sense only when the following three 
conditions are jointly satisfied : (i) the context adds some element to the interpretation of the 
utterance ; (ii) that element is truth-conditionally relevant, it affects the proposition 
expressed (so this is unlike conversational implicatures); yet (iii) its contextual provision is 
not necessary, in the sense that, if that element was left aside, the utterance would still express 
a complete proposition (this is in contrast to indexicals, pronouns, and the other type of 
context-sensitive expressions we talked about above). 
Consider the following example, due to Robyn Carston : 
 
(2) Jean went to Austria last week and she ran into John. 
 
One naturally interpret the second conjunct ("she ran into John") as expressing the proposition 
that Jean ran into John in Austria. The location of the event of running into John is 
contextually assumed to be the same as the location mentioned in the first conjunct, but that 
assumption is defeasible, as contextual assumptions typically are. What is important, 
however, is that the contextual provision of a location for the event mentioned in the second 
conjunct is not mandatory : it is perfectly ok to interpret a sentence like "she ran into John" as 
saying that Jean ran into John in some place or other, without the place in question being 
contextually specified or specifiable. This is in contrast with standard indexicals or pronouns : 
for the sentence does not express a complete proposition unless the indexicals or unbound 
pronouns it contains are assigned definite values. 
 
IV. PRAGMATIC MODULATION IN GENERAL 
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Free enrichment is only one type of case in which a pragmatic process that is optional (in 
contrast to the contextual assignment of values to indexicals and free variables of all sorts) 
nevertheless affects the proposition expressed. In Literal Meaning and subsequent work, I 
used the term "modulation" (as opposed to "saturation") as a generic term for the entire class. 
The general idea is this : 
 
In context the meaning of words is adjusted or 'modulated' so as to fit what is being 
talked about. Sense modulation is essential to speech, because we use a (more or less) 
fixed stock of lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of things, situations and 
experiences. Through the interaction between the context-independent meanings of 
our words and the particulars of the situation talked about, contextualised, modulated 
senses emerge, appropriate to the situation at hand. (Recanati 2004 : 131) 
 
Saturation is a pragmatic process of contextual value-assignment that is triggered (and 
made obligatory) by something in the sentence itself, namely the linguistic expression to 
which a value is contextually assigned. The expression itself acts as a variable in need of 
contextual instantiation. So pragmatics comes into play (in order to determine which value to 
assign in context to the variable), but it does so under the guidance of the linguistic material : 
the pragmatic process of saturation is a ‗bottom-up‘ process in the sense that it is signal-
driven, not context-driven. In contrast, modulation is a ‗top-down‘ or ‗free‘ pragmatic 
process, i.e. a process which is not triggered by an expression in the sentence but is context-
driven and takes place for purely pragmatic reasons — in order to make sense of what the 
speaker is saying. 
Modulation operates on the meaning of an expression (simple or complex) and returns 
a meaning of the same type. In free enrichment, the output sense is more specific than the 
input sense. Free enrichment typically works by narrowing down the extension of an 
expression through the contextual addition of a component to its meaning. For example, 
through free enrichment, the (intransitive) verb "to smoke" can come to mean to smoke 
marijuana, if the context makes it clear that that‘s what we are talking about. What is added 
to the meaning of the verb is a specification of its internal accusative — the type of thing 
smoked — just as in (2) what is added is a specification of the location of the event of running 
into John. 
Sense extension (also called loosening or broadening) is another modulation process 
which works in the opposite direction : the meaning of an expression is made less specific, 
and its extension typically wider, through the contextual deletion of a component of its 
meaning (Cohen 2002 : chapters 3 and 5 ; Franks 1995). Thus consider 
 
(3) The ATM swallowed my credit card 
 
This can be given a literal reading, if we imagine a context à la Putnam in which ATMs turn 
out to be living organisms (for only living organisms can swallow). But the sentence can also 
and typically will be interpreted non-literally. In an ordinary context, "swallow" will be given 
an extended sense, corresponding to what ATMs sometimes do with credit cards (something 
which, indeed, resembles swallowing). The sentence may be true, on such a reading, even 
though no real swallowing takes place. 
Another key modulation process is predicate transfer (Nunberg 1995). In predicate 
transfer the input sense is a property F, and the output sense is another property F‘, definable 
in terms of F, along the following lines : 
 
F‘ =def  x [(Qy : Rx,y) Fy] 
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In this schema representing the transferred property F‘, "Q" and "R" are place-holders for, 
respectively, a quantificational determiner and a relation that are left free (within certain 
limits) and will be determined in context. So F‘ is the property one has whenever, for Q object 
y one bears relation R to, y is F. In Nunberg‘s famous example, "I am parked out back," F is 
the property of being parked out back (a property only a vehicle can have), R is the ownership 
relation between cars and car owners, and Q may be the existential quantifier.  F‘, then, is the 
property of having a car that is parked out back. It is that property which the words "parked 
out back" arguably ascribe to the speaker in "I am parked out back." 
 
V. THE ‘SYNTACTIC’ APPROACH 
 
Even though free enrichment is only one type of modulation among others, the phrase  
"pragmatic enrichment" is often used as a generic term, synonymous with my own term  
"pragmatic modulation." One reason for this is that modulation can be thought of as operating 
on expressions (‗syntactic‘ construal), rather than directly on their meanings (‗semantic‘ 
construal). When so construed, modulation amounts to supplementing the overt expression 
with implicit elements, and so it counts as a form of ‗enrichment‘, whatever its semantic 
effect. 
On the semantic construal of pragmatic modulation, the meaning of an expression is 
mapped to a distinct meaning. On the syntactic construal, it is the expression (or a 
corresponding mental representation) that is mapped to a more complex 
expression/representation through the addition of extra elements. For example, a sentence like 
(4) has several readings : 
 
(4) There is a lion in the middle of the piazza 
 
On one reading "lion" is given a non-literal interpretation through predicate transfer and (4) 
may be true even if, literally, there is no lion in the middle of the piazza (but only a statue of a 
lion). An advocate of the ‗syntactic‘ approach to pragmatic modulation will argue that "lion" 
is mapped to "representation of a lion" through the addition of an operator REPRESENTATION 
OF. Likewise, sense extension will be said to proceed through the addition of some kind of 
similarity operator. On this view pragmatic modulation always is a form of enrichment or 
supplementation of a (linguistic or mental) representation, making it into a more complex 
representation. 
The syntactic approach to pragmatic modulation has one putative advantage over the 
semantic approach : it can provide a simple response to an argument against pragmatic 
enrichment known as the "binding argument." According to the argument, implicit elements 
of content (e.g. the implicit reference to Austria in the second conjunct of (2)) cannot, in 
general, be due to free pragmatic enrichment, because the elements in question can be made 
to vary with the cases introduced by a quantifier, as in 
 
(5) Whenever I light a cigarette, it starts raining. 
 
On the most salient reading, this means that whenever I light a cigarette, it starts raining at the 
location where I light the cigarette. Here the location of the raining event is an implicit 
element of content, as is the location of the event of running into John in example (2) above, 
but it varies with the cases introduced by "whenever I light a cigarette." Implicit bound 
readings like this raise a problem for pragmatic enrichment accounts, Stanley (2000) argued, 
because binding requires a variable that can be bound (here, a location variable), and variables 
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are syntactic objects. According to free enrichment accounts of implicit content, however, the 
location in (2), (5) and similar examples is supposed to be inarticulated in the syntax, which 
means that there is no location variable in the syntax which could be bound ; nor could the 
variable be generated through pragmatic enrichment, since pragmatic enrichment (on the 
semantic construal) only maps meanings to meanings. However, assuming that this is correct 
and that implicit bound readings cannot be generated through pragmatic enrichment 
semantically construed, they can still be generated through pragmatic enrichment, 
syntactically construed. Nothing prevents the syntactic-enrichment process from contextually 
supplementing the overt sentence with implicit variables or pronouns directly or indirectly 
bound by the overt quantifier (Recanati 2002 : 338-42). 
 
VI. TWO VARIANTS OF THE ‘SYNTACTIC’ APPROACH 
 
There are two main variants of the ‗syntactic‘ approach to pragmatic modulation : the natural-
language (NL) variant and the language-of-thought (LOT) variant. 
On the NL variant, pragmatic enrichment is the process whereby a natural language 
expression (that which is actually uttered, e.g. the word "lion" in the above example) is 
mapped to another natural language expression ("lion statue"), which is not uttered but might 
have been, and which can be contextually recovered from the sentence that is actually uttered. 
This is the ‗shorthand‘ view put forward (inter alia) by Kent Bach (1994, 2000) and Stephen 
Neale (2000, 2004). On this view modulation works by enriching or supplementing the 
sentence with contextually recoverable extra materials, as in the following examples, due to 
Kent Bach : 
 
            Jack and Jill went up the hill [together]. 
            Jack and Jill are married [to each other]. 
            Jill got married and [then] got pregnant. 
            You‘ll succeed if [and only if] you work hard. 
            There are [approximately] 30 students per class. 
            France is hexagonal [roughly speaking]. 
            Otto has [exactly] three cars. 
            Felix has always been an honest judge [since he’s been a judge]. 
            Adele hasn‘t had lunch [today]. 
            You‘re not going to die [from this cut]. 
 
As Bach (2000 : 262-63) puts it, "we generally speak loosely, omitting words that could have 
made what we meant more explicit and letting our audience fill in the gaps." In such cases  
"what the speaker means is a qualified version of what he is saying. He would have to utter 
the words in brackets (or roughly equivalent words—the exact words don‘t matter) to make 
what he meant more explicit." The words in question "are not part of the sentence (these are 
not cases of syntactic ellipsis) but the speaker could have uttered them if he deemed that 
necessary." 
On the LOT variant, put forward by relevance theorists (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 
Carston 2002) and by Jerry Fodor (2001), natural language expressions are assumed to 
translate into language of thought strings (sometimes called "semantic" or "conceptual" 
representations). Pragmatic enrichment is the process whereby the language of thought string 
into which the uttered expression translates is contextually enriched with extra symbols, to 
which nothing corresponds in the uttered expression. It is the richer language of thought string 
resulting from the enrichment process which determines the (intuitive) truth-conditions of the 
utterance : the truth-conditions of the utterance are the truth-conditions one gets by subjecting 
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the contextually enriched LOT string (rather than the natural language sentence or its 
mentalese translation) to model-theoretic interpretation. 
As Paul Elbourne points out, the NL variant is more constrained than the LOT variant. 
"Enrichment in [the first kind of] theory can only yield meanings that could be obtained by 
syntactically building on the material present in the syntax [of the natural language 
expression]. No such constraint is present in the [other kind of] theory" (Elbourne 2008 : 95). 
"Theories of [the second] kind, then, are potentially vulnerable in the following way: if a 
reading turns out to be unavailable for a given sentence, they cannot avail themselves of 
syntactic constraints to explain its absence, (…) and they will face real difficulty if the 
reading in question can be argued to be pragmatically plausible" (Elbourne 2010). Still, it is 
easy to introduce an analogous constraint into the LOT variant, and it is that sort of hybrid 
view which Stephen Neale seems to be defending. On such a hybrid view a LOT string is 
considered as an admissible enrichment of (the mentalese translation of) the uttered sentence 
only if it is the mentalese translation of a sentence one can get by supplementing the uttered 
sentence with extra materials. 
 Even if we take the syntactic constraint on board, there is an obvious overgeneration 
objection looming. Many readings one could get by freely enriching the uttered sentence with 
extra words are simply not available (Stanley 2002, 2005, Elbourne 2010). Extra constraints 
will therefore be needed to filter out the absent readings. (See Elbourne 2008 and Hall 2008 
for attempts to address some of the overgeneration worries.) Overgeneration is also a problem 
for semantic approaches to pragmatic modulation. In general, pragmatic 
modulation/enrichment is such a powerful mechanism that it needs to be suitably constrained. 
Thus predicate transfer as a general mechanism ought to make it possible to interpret the 
sentence "I was once driven by Jean Gabin" to mean that the speaker owns a car that was once 
driven by Jean Gabin. That reading is very unlikely, however, for reasons that are essentially 
pragmatic and are well-worth investigating (see Nunberg 1979, 1995 for a pragmatic 
approach to the constraints on predicate transfer). 
 
VII. IS PRAGMATIC ENRICHMENT RELEVANT TO SEMANTICS ? 
 
It is tempting to appeal to pragmatic enrichment/modulation whenever an element of 
meaning, e.g. the location of the event of running into John in (2), remains implicit yet seems 
to be truth-conditionally relevant. The standard strategy in linguistics consists in dealing with 
such examples by positing unpronounced elements in the syntax. But in many cases, such 
covert elements can only be detected by pragmatic means, and there is only a short step from 
the idea that they are detected on a pragmatic basis to the idea that they are generated on a 
pragmatic basis. As Ariel Cohen (2009) puts it, if an element is phonologically null, the 
hearer can‘t hear it ; if the hearer nevertheless proceeds as if that element was present, s/he 
must apply some reinterpretation of the input so as to introduce that element. Modulation is 
the case in which such reinterpretation proceeds on a purely pragmatic basis. 
Despite the appeal of the idea, and the fact that it promises to simplify both syntax and 
semantics, there is deep resistance to it and it has been rather under-utilized in formal 
semantics. In the final sections of this entry, I discuss what I take to be the main sources of 
resistance, besides the overgeneration worry which has already been mentioned. 
First and foremost, there is resistance to the very idea that free pragmatic processes 
might affect ‗what is said‘ – the proposition expressed by an utterance — as suggested by the 
idea that modulation belongs to the semantic layer of interpretation. Free pragmatic processes 
are pragmatic processes that are not mandated by the linguistic material but take place for 
wholly pragmatic reasons, in order to make sense of the speaker. They are ‗top down‘ 
processes, rather than ‗bottom up‘ pragmatic processes triggered by something in the 
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linguistic signal. That such processes could affect what is said seems to be a contradiction in 
terms. ‗What is said‘, the truth-conditional content of an utterance, is what is literally said, 
and that — by definition — has to be determined by the conventions of the language. 
Pragmatics can enter the picture, provided its role is to assign a contextual value to a lexical 
item in a bottom-up manner, i.e. in accord with (and under the guidance of) the conventional 
meaning of that context-sensitive item. In contrast, what King and Stanley (2005 : 118-119) 
call "strong pragmatic effects," i.e. pragmatic effects achieved in order to make sense of the 
speech act without being linguistically mandated, take us into the realm of speaker‘s meaning, 
away from literal meaning. 
Insofar as this argument is based upon a certain understanding of the phrase "what is 
said" (or "what is literally said"), it is not substantive, but verbal. There is no doubt that one 
can define "what is said" in such a way that only weak pragmatic effects can affect what is 
said. But what the advocate of pragmatic modulation means by "what is said" corresponds to 
the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance. Now, the intuitive truth-conditions of 
an utterance of (3) or (4) above are affected by free pragmatic processes of predicate transfer 
or sense extension. (4) can be intuitively true even though no real lion stands in the middle of 
the piazza, and (3) can be true even though no real swallowing takes place. So there is a sense 
of "what is said" in which what is said is affected by pragmatic modulation. Assuming this is 
true, this does not prevent us from defining another notion of what is said, conforming to 
literalist standards. 
The second objection to pragmatic modulation (or rather, to the idea that it affects 
semantic content) is the following. If free pragmatic processes are allowed to affect semantic 
content, semantic content leaps out of control — it is no longer determined by the rules of the 
language but varies freely, à la Humpty Dumpty. But then, how can we account for the 
success of communication ? Communication (content sharing) becomes a miracle since there 
is nothing to ensure that communicators and their adressees will converge on the same 
content. Now communication is possible (it takes place all the time), and there is no miracle. 
It follows that we should give up the view that free pragmatic processes play a role in the 
determination of semantic content (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: chapter 8). 
This argument fails, I believe, because the problem it raises is a problem for 
everybody. Whenever the semantic value of a linguistic expression (e.g. the reference of a 
demonstrative) must be pragmatically inferred, the question arises, what guarantees that the 
hearer will be able to latch on to the exact same semantic value as the speaker? Whether the 
pragmatic process at stake is saturation or modulation is irrelevant as far as this issue is 
concerned, so the argument fails as an argument specifically intended to cast doubt on 
pragmatic modulation. 
 
VIII. THE SYSTEMATICITY OBJECTION 
 
The most important source of resistance to the idea of pragmatic modulation is the fear that, if 
something like pragmatic modulation is allowed as a determinant of semantic content, the 
project of constructing a systematic, truth-conditional semantics for natural language will be 
doomed to failure. Here is a first sketch of an argument for that conclusion :  
 
In contrast to the contextual assignment of values to indexicals, modulation is not 
driven by the linguistic meaning of words. Nothing in the linguistic meaning of the 
words whose sense is modulated tells us that modulation ought to take place. 
Modulation takes place purely as a matter of context, of ‗pragmatics‘ ; what drives it is 
the urge to make sense of what the speaker is saying. So modulation is unsystematic. 
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If we allow it as a determinant of semantic content, we make it impossible to construct 
a systematic theory of semantic content.  
 
Thus formulated, the argument is not convincing. Let us grant the objector that 
modulation is unsystematic. Still, it is easy to make room for it within a systematic semantics 
(Pagin and Pelletier 2007 ; Westerståhl forthcoming). In general, nothing prevents 
unsystematic factors from being handled systematically, by being assigned their proper place 
in the theory. In the case at hand, assuming the semantic approach to pragmatic modulation, 
we can define a function mod taking as argument an expression e and the context c in which it 
occurs : the value of mod is the particular modulation function g that is contextually 
salient/relevant/appropriate for the interpretation of that expression in that context. If no 
modulation is contextually appropriate and the expression receives its literal interpretation, 
the value of mod will be the identity function. In this framework, we can distinguish between 
the literal sense of a simple expression e, namely its semantic interpretation I(e), and the 
modulated sense M(e)c carried by an occurrence of e in context c. The modulated sense of an 
expression e (in context c) results from applying the contextually appropriate modulation 
function mod (e, c) = g to its semantic interpretation I(e): 
 
M(e)c = mod (e, c) (I(e)) = g (I(e)) 
 
So far, this is very standard : in distinguishing I(e) from M(e)c we are just appealing to the 
traditional semantics/pragmatics distinction. What is not standard is the claim that the 
semantic interpretation of a complex expression (e.g. a sentence) is a function of the 
modulated senses of its parts and the way they are put together (Recanati 2010 : chapter 
1). This is what examples like (3) and (4) suggest if we take at face value the effects of 
modulation on truth-conditional content which they seem to display. On the resulting view the 
semantic process of composition and the pragmatic process of sense modulation are 
intertwined. For simple expressions, their semantic interpretation is their literal sense, but for 
complex expressions pragmatic modulation is allowed to enter into the determination of 
semantic content. This is nonstandard, for sure, but there is nothing unsystematic about this 
view. 
The systematicity objection can be understood differently, however. In introducing 
modulation (in contrast to saturation), I said that in saturation "pragmatics comes into play, 
but does so under the guidance of the linguistic material," whereas modulation "is not 
triggered by an expression in the sentence but takes place for purely pragmatic reasons — in 
order to make sense of what the speaker is saying." This suggests that, insofar as it involves 
modulation, utterance interpretation does not significantly differ from "the kind [of 
interpretation] involved in interpreting kicks under the table and taps on the shoulder" 
(Stanley 2000: 396). Stanley objects that "we do not interpret these latter sorts of acts by 
applying highly specific rules to structured representations," as formal semanticists say we do 
in the linguistic case. Accepting the semantic relevance of pragmatic modulation thus seems  
incompatible with the programme of formal semantics, according to which utterance 
interpretation is a systematic affair and differs, in this respect, from the (pragmatic) 
interpretation of gestures. 
Thus understood, however, I think the objection is confused. Even though free 
pragmatic processes, i.e. pragmatic processes that are not mandated by the standing meaning 
of any expression in the sentence, are allowed to enter into the determination of truth-
conditional content, still, in the framework I have sketched, they come into the picture as part 
of the compositional machinery. Semantic interpretation remains grammar-driven even if, in 
the course of semantic interpretation, pragmatics is appealed to not only to assign contextual 
 11 
values to indexicals and free variables but also to freely modulate the senses of the 
constituents in a top-down manner. Semantic interpretation is still a matter of determining the 
sense of the whole as a function of the (possibly modulated) senses of the parts and the way 
they are put together. 
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